

Course: Philosophy of Mind and Epistemology, KU Leuven
ID: B-KUL-W0FC1A / B-KUL-W0EO9A
Academic year: 2015-2016
Time: Fri. 9:00-11:00, 1st term
Venue: PI - Room 00.10
Instructor: Fernando Broncano-Berrocal
Contact: fernando.broncanoberrocal@hiw.kuleuven.be
Office hours: Fri. 11:00–12:00 / on appointment by e-mail. Office: PI 01.08

Course Guide — Topics in the Intersection of Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind

The Philosophy of Mind *and* Epistemology Seminar changes its topic every year but it is typically *either* in epistemology *or* in the philosophy of mind. In contrast, the 2015-2016 seminar will cover topics in the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of mind. This three-month research seminar offers you the opportunity to become familiar with topics that are of interest both to epistemologists and philosophers of mind. The seminar will be dynamic: each session will be devoted to a different debate, combining readings of both philosophical areas.

1 Aims

The seminar is a research seminar. You are expected to:

1. Present a topic to your classmates.
2. Delve into a topic in a research paper.
3. Prepare for the seminar by having closely read the assigned reading —and ideally the introductory readings.
4. Attend and participate in the seminar sessions.

This is what you should have achieved by the end of the course:

- * *Knowledge:* You should possess a profound knowledge of the current state of the art concerning the different topics of the seminar sessions.
- * *Independence in research:* You should be able to formulate an original research question, develop a well-defined research approach and set up a well-organized research plan concerning one topic.
- * *Writing skills:* You should be able to write an original, clearly written and well-structured research paper following your research plan.
- * *Oral communication skills:* You should be able to present and systematically defend orally the results of your research, stating with clarity your personal standpoint concerning the different topics.

Previous Knowledge

Knowledge of analytic philosophy —epistemology and/or philosophy of mind— will be useful, but not required. If you feel that your background in analytic philosophy is not enough, don't hesitate to let me know. Individual or group tutoring sessions will be scheduled during office hours. Good oral and writing skills in English are required.

2 Contents

The course is organized in three modules: (1) *Epistemological Sources*, (2) *Knowledge and Consciousness*, and (3) *Extended and Collective Mentality*. Each module features different topics in epistemology and philosophy of mind. Each seminar session will be on a different topic.

Module 1: Epistemological Sources

- 1.1 Intuition: A Guide to Truth?
- 1.2 The Epistemology of Memory
- 1.3 Perception: Distinguishing the Senses
- 1.4 The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: Epistemological Implications

Module 2: Knowledge and Consciousness

- 2.1 Self-Consciousness: Immunity to Error Through Misidentification
- 2.2 Anti-Individualism and Self-Knowledge
- 2.3 The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism
- 2.4 The Epistemic Role of Attention

Module 3: Extended and Collective Mentality

- 3.1 Extended Mind and Extended Knowledge
- 3.2 Collective Belief
- 3.3 Group Justification

Each topic has a corresponding bibliography in which you will find (1) one or more introductory readings; (2) one or more mandatory readings; (3) a list of advanced readings. *Introductory readings* will help you understand what the topics are about. They will be especially helpful when it comes to choosing the topics for presentation and for the term paper and when preparing your presentation or for the seminar sessions. *Mandatory readings* are key papers in the topics of the course. Seminar discussions will revolve around them, so you *need* to read those papers. *Advanced readings* will be of help when writing your research paper. They are indications on where you can start investigating a topic —remember that you are expected to do your own research.

2.1 Module 1: Epistemological Sources

Many psychological factors give rise to beliefs but not all confer knowledge or justification: consider beliefs that arise out of wishful thinking, guessing, emotional states, prejudices or biases. One of the classical tasks in epistemology has been to study the sources of knowledge and justification. The list includes perception, memory, reasoning, introspection, and testimony. Philosophers of mind —and philosophers of psychology and cognitive science— have extensively studied them as well, and their findings bear on epistemological debates. That is, issues concerning epistemological sources are at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of mind. This module will focus on three particular epistemological sources: intuition, memory, and perception.

2.1.1 Intuition: A Guide to Truth?

The rise of experimental philosophy has put the use of intuitions in philosophical theorizing on the spot. For example, much of contemporary epistemology is based on the use of the method of cases, which consists in obtaining intuitions from thought experiments to use them in philosophical argumentation. However, do intuitions really serve as evidence for or against philosophical theories? How reliable is intuition? How reliable are philosophers in intuiting? Are they expert intuiters? Should the intuitions of lay people be trusted? What are intuitions in the first place?

Introductory readings:

- ▶ Lycan, W. G. (2011). Epistemology and the Role of Intuitions. In Bernecker, S. & Pritchard, D. (eds). *The Routledge Companion to Epistemology*. Routledge.

- ▶ Nagel, J. (2007). Epistemic Intuitions. *Philosophy Compass* 2: 792–819.
- ▶ Pust, J. Intuition. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Mandatory reading:

- ▶ Nagel, J. (2012). Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 85: 495-527.

Advanced readings:

An exhaustive and commented list of references may be found in:

- ▶ Machery, E. & O’Neill, E. (eds.) (2014). *Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy*. Routledge. (Check the section entitled “Part IV Suggested Readings”)

A good paper to start investigating the nature of intuitions:

- ▶ Chudnoff, E. (2011). What Intuitions Are Like. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 82: 625-54.

A monograph devoted to argue against relying on intuitions as evidence in philosophy:

- ▶ Cappelen, H. (2012). *Philosophy Without Intuitions*. Oxford University Press.

For fun:

Jennifer Nagel and Joshua Alexander discuss intuitions on Philosophy TV (<https://vimeo.com/91851671>)

2.1.2 The Epistemology of Memory

Empirical studies on memory are concerned with the actual workings of memory —e.g., its neurophysiological basis, the conditions under which it is reliable or unreliable. The metaphysics of memory is concerned with investigating questions such as what the primary intentional objects of memory states are or what kind of causal processes connect past representations to their retrieval. The epistemology of memory, by contrast, tries to spell out the conditions under which memory is justification or knowledge-conducive. A heated debate in the epistemology of memory concerns whether memory only preserves epistemic justification over time or whether it is also able to generate it.

Introductory readings:

- ▶ Bernecker, S. (2011). Memory Knowledge. In Bernecker, S. & Pritchard, D. (eds). *The Routledge Companion to Epistemology*. Routledge.
- ▶ Firth, M. Epistemology of Memory. *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
- ▶ Senor, T. D. Epistemological Problems of Memory. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
- ▶ Sutton, J. Memory. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Mandatory reading:

- ▶ Fernández, J. (2015). Epistemic Generation in Memory. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, doi: 10.1111/phpr.12189

Advanced readings:

An exhaustive and commented list of references may be found in:

- ▶ Firth, M. Epistemology of Memory. *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

For fun:

- ▶ Elizabeth Loftus: How Reliable Is Your Memory? (TED Talk) (http://www.ted.com/talks/elizabeth_loftus_the_fiction_of_memory?)

2.1.3 Perception: Distinguishing the Senses

Perception furnishes us with an enormous amount of information. That information comes in several ways: we see, we hear, we touch, we taste and we smell things. The senses, or sensory modalities, are the ways we perceive the world. But what kind of faculty counts as a sense? What principle distinguishes the senses from one another? How many senses are there? How many could there be?

Introductory reading:

- ▶ Matthen, M. (2015). The Individuation of the Senses. In *Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception*. Oxford University Press: 567-86.

Mandatory reading:

- ▶ Macpherson, F. (2011). Taxonomising the Senses. *Philosophical Studies* 153 (1):123-42.

Advanced readings:

Most key papers are collected in the following two volumes:

- ▶ Macpherson, F. (ed.) (2011). *The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives*. Oxford University Press.
- ▶ Stokes, D., Matthen, M. & Biggs, S. (eds.) (2014). *Perception and Its Modalities*. Oxford University Press.

For fun:

- ▶ David Eagleman: Can We Create New Senses for Humans? (TED talk) (http://www.ted.com/talks/david_eagleman_can_we_create_new_senses_for_humans)

2.1.4 Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: Epistemological Implications

Traditionally, perception has thought to be cognitively impenetrable by cognitive states such as emotions, beliefs or desires. The cognitive penetrability thesis denies that and holds that perception is sometimes penetrated by cognition. For example, suppose that you believe that someone is angry at you. When you encounter that person, that belief makes your visual experience of that person's face as expressing anger, and that experience, when taken at face value, makes you believe that the other person is angry. Your visual belief has been cognitively penetrated by your first belief and it has given rise to the same belief. Cases like this pose a challenge to perceptual justification because cognitive penetration seems to introduce a circular structure to belief formation. Are the different theories of perceptual justification able to accommodate the phenomenon? What is exactly cognitive penetration?

Introductory reading:

- ▶ Stokes, D. (2013). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. *Philosophy Compass* 8: 646–63.

Mandatory reading:

- ▶ Ghijzen, H. (*forthcoming*). The Real Epistemic Problem of Cognitive Penetration. *Philosophical Studies*.

Advanced readings:

Key recent papers are collected in the following volume:

- ▶ Zeimbeki, J. and Raftopoulos, A. (2015). *The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception*. Oxford University Press.

Cognitive penetration in the philosophy of mind literature:

- ▶ Chasid, A. (2014). Visual Experience: Cognitive Penetrability and Indeterminacy. *Acta Analytica* 29: 119–30.
- ▶ Macpherson, F. (2012). Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 84: 24–62.
- ▶ Vetter, P. & Newen, A. (2014). Varieties of Cognitive Penetration in Visual Perception. *Consciousness and Cognition* 27: 62–75.
- ▶ Wu, W. (2013). Visual Spatial Constancy and Modularity: Does Intention Penetrate Vision? *Philosophical Studies* 165: 647–69.

Cognitive penetration in the epistemological literature:

- ▶ Lyons, J. (2011). Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. *Philosophical Issues* 21: 289–311.
- ▶ McGrath, M. (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The “Bad Basis” Counterexamples. In Tucker, C. (ed.) *Seemings and Justification*, Oxford University Press: 225–47.
- ▶ Siegel, S. (2012). Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification. *Noûs* 46: 201–22.
- ▶ Siegel, S. (2013). The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience. *Philosophical Studies* 162: 697–722.
- ▶ Tucker, C. (2014). If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too. *Dialectica* 68: 35–62.
- ▶ Vahid, H. (2014). Cognitive Penetration, the Downgrade Principle, and Extended Cognition. *Philosophical Issues* 24: 439–59.

For fun:

- ▶ Donald Hoffman: Do We See Reality as It Is? (TED Talk) (https://www.ted.com/talks/donald_hoffman_do_we_see_reality_as_it_is?)

2.2 Module 2: Knowledge and Consciousness

There are interesting connections between consciousness—one of the major topics in philosophy of mind—and knowledge—one of the major topics in epistemology. This module explores some of them. In particular, it will focus on the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification concerning self-consciousness, the seemingly incompatibility between self-knowledge and externalism about mental content, knowledge of phenomenal concepts—and its implications for physicalism—and the epistemic role of attention.

2.2.1 Self-Consciousness: Immunity to Error Through Misidentification

Some self-conscious thoughts, that is, thoughts with first-person content, seem to be immune to error through misidentification. A misidentification occurs, for example, when you mistake the mailman for your next-door neighbor, and you think that it is your next-door neighbor who is a nice person, when in fact it is the mailman who is. The peculiarity of certain thoughts with first-person content is that one might be mistaken with respect to the property that is being self-ascribed—e.g., the property of being nice—but not with respect to the subject of the self-ascription—*me* being nice—. Immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) bears on theories of self-consciousness and self-knowledge. But what are the sources of IEM? How many varieties of IEM are there? Are there empirical counterexamples to IEM?

Introductory readings:

- ▶ Kriegel, U. Self-Consciousness. *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Mandatory reading:

- ▶ Coliva, A. (2006). Error through Misidentification: Some Varieties. *Journal of Philosophy* 103: 407-25.

Advanced readings:

Recent papers are collected in the following volume:

- ▶ Prosser, S. & Recanati, F. (eds.) (2012). *Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays*. Cambridge University Press.

Some key papers:

- ▶ Campbell, J. (1999). Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons and Thinking as a Motor Process. *The Monist* 82: 609-25.
- ▶ Coliva, A. (2002). Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. *Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology* 9: 27-34.
- ▶ Lane, T. & Liang, C. (2011). Self-Consciousness and Immunity. *Journal of Philosophy* 108: 78-99.
- ▶ Pryor, J. (1999). Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. *Philosophical Topics* 26: 271-304.
- ▶ Shoemaker, S. (1968). Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. *Journal of Philosophy* 65: 555-67.
- ▶ Smith, J. (2006). Which Immunity to Error? *Philosophical Studies* 130: 273-83.

For fun:

- ▶ Rubber Hand Illusion (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TCQbygiG0RU>)
- ▶ Body-Swap Illusion (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rawY2VzN4-c>)

2.2.2 Anti-Individualism and Self-Knowledge

A widespread thesis in philosophy of mind is that of anti-individualism or externalism about mental content, according to which the meaning or content of a thought is partly determined by the environment/supervenies on non-individualistic properties. However, that thesis seems to clash with the plausible thesis that we can know from the armchair what content our thoughts have. For example, it has been argued that if anti-individualism is true, then we can know from the armchair contingent facts about the world, but that seems absurd. Which one of the two thesis should we drop? Are we obliged to drop one of the theses? Compatibilists argue that both theses are compatible. Incompatibilists deny that.

Introductory readings:

- ▶ Parent, T. Externalism and Self-Knowledge. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
- ▶ Smith, B. Internalism and Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind and Language. *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Mandatory readings:

- ▶ Brueckner, A. L. (2007). Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent. In McLaughlin, B. P. & Cohen, J. D. (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind*. Blackwell: 37-52.
- ▶ McKinsey, M. (2007). Externalism and Privileged Access are Inconsistent. In McLaughlin, B. P. & Cohen, J. D. (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind*. Blackwell: 53-65.

Advanced readings:

The PhilPapers category “Externalism and Self-Knowledge” (<http://philpapers.org/browse/externalism-and-self-knowledge>), edited by T. Parent, has a brief but excellent introduction to the literature.

Classic papers are collected in the following volume:

- ▶ Ludlow, P. & Martin, N. (eds.) (1998). *Externalism and Self-Knowledge*. CSLI.

More recent volumes collecting relevant papers:

- ▶ Brueckner, A. & Ebbs, G. (2012). *Debating Self-Knowledge*. Cambridge University Press.
- ▶ Goldberg, S. (ed.) (2007). *Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology*. Oxford University Press.
- ▶ Nuccetelli, S. (ed.) (2003). *New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge*. MIT Press.

For fun:

- ▶ Putnam’s Twin Earth Thought Experiment (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KE8NL9G_Fq8)

2.2.3 The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism

Physicalism—or materialism—is the thesis that everything that exists in the universe is physical. Against that thesis, Frank Jackson introduced one of the most thought-provoking and discussed thought experiments in contemporary philosophy. Since she was born, (1) Mary has been trained as a neuroscientist to the point that she has come to know everything about the physical facts and processes that are relevant to color vision, and (2) she has been raised in a room where all objects are black, white or grey, so she has never experienced other colors. Although she has complete physical knowledge, it seems that she does not know all the facts. For example, she does not know what it is like to see red. Does she learn a new fact about what it is like to see red when she gets out of the room and sees a tomato for the first time? If the answer is positive, it seems that facts about the character of conscious experience are over and above the physical facts, so physicalism is false. Different physicalist arguments try to show that the answer to that question is “no”.

Introductory readings:

- ▶ Alter, T. The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism. *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
- ▶ Howell, R. J. (2011). The Knowledge Argument and the Implications of Phenomenal Knowledge. *Philosophy Compass* 6: 459-68.
- ▶ Nida-Rümelin, M. Qualia: The Knowledge Argument. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
- ▶ Stoljar, D. & Nagasawa, Y. (2004). Introduction to *There’s Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument*. In Ludlow, P. Stoljar, D. & Nagasawa, Y. (eds.), *There’s Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument*. MIT Press.

Mandatory reading:

- ▶ Chalmers, David J. (2004). Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument. In Ludlow, P. Stoljar, D. & Nagasawa, Y. (eds.), *There’s Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument*. MIT Press: 269-98.

Advanced readings:

Key papers are collected in the following two volumes:

- ▶ Alter, T. & Walter, S. (eds.) (2007). *Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism*. Oxford University Press.

▶ Ludlow, P. Stoljar, D. & Nagasawa, Y. (eds.) (2004). *There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument*. MIT Press.

For fun:

▶ Mary the Super-Scientist (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gZy3Ky9y_fg)

2.2.4 The Epistemic Role of Attention

Attention is typically conceived as a form of awareness, and we all are certainly aware of what attention is. But is it possible to attend to something without being aware of it? Is it possible, on the other hand, to be conscious of something with attending to it? In sum, what is the relation between consciousness and attention? The issue is not only relevant to theories of consciousness, but also to the epistemic role of attention. For example, can consciousness outside attention sometimes supply justification for belief? Some authors have tried to give a positive answer to that question, but much more discussion is needed and there is a lot of philosophical work to be done.

Introductory readings:

- ▶ Mole, C. Attention. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
- ▶ Waltz, S. (2011). The Nature of Attention. *Philosophy Compass*, 6: 842–53.
- ▶ Waltz, S. (2011). The Philosophical Significance of Attention. *Philosophy Compass*, 6: 722–33.

Mandatory reading:

▶ Siegel, S. & Silins, N. (2014). Consciousness, Attention, and Justification. In Zardini, E. & Dodd, D. (eds.), *Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism and Perceptual Justification*. Oxford University Press: 149-169.

Advanced readings:

All the relevant references may be found in this excellent monograph on the psychology, neuroscience, metaphysics, and epistemology of attention:

▶ Wu, W. (2014). *Attention*. Routledge.

A collection of key papers:

▶ Mole, C., Smithies, D. & Wu, W. (eds.) (2011). *Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays*. Oxford University Press.

For fun:

- ▶ Apollo Robbins: The Art of Misdirection (TED Talk) (http://www.ted.com/talks/apollo_robbins_the_art_of_misdirection)
- ▶ Selective Attention Test (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJG698U2Mvo>)
- ▶ Blindsight: (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R4SYxTecL8E>)
- ▶ The Neuroscience of Cocktail Party Conversations (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kW86cDBZNL0>)

2.3 Module 3: Extended and Collective Mentality

Epistemologists and philosophers of mind have traditionally addressed topics such as the mind, consciousness, knowledge or belief in individualistic terms. Recent approaches in cognitive science such as distributed cognition—which investigates how cognition may be distributed through social and technological means—have influenced philosophers to investigate the possibility that mental states and cognitive processes extend beyond the boundaries of the skull as well as the possibility that groups can perform intentional actions and hold beliefs in a way that is not reducible to the intentional actions or beliefs of their individual members. This module will revolve around these topics.

2.3.1 Extended Mind and Extended Knowledge

The hypothesis of the extended mind says that mental states and cognitive processes extend outside the skull, where parts of the external world play an analogous role to that of internal brain processes in the formation and maintenance of those mental states. Extended memory is perhaps the most discussed case. Suppose that a person suffering from Alzheimer stores her memories in a notebook and constantly consults it to recall them. If the extended mind hypothesis is true, that person does not merely use the notebook as an aid to her memory: the notebook *is* her memory. What conditions must a cognitive process or a mental state fulfill to count as “extended”? That is the subject of an interesting debate in philosophy of mind. On the other hand, the extended mind hypothesis raises equally interesting questions in epistemology. For example, the person suffering from Alzheimer plausibly obtains knowledge by consulting her memories in her notebook. If that is correct, it seems that epistemological views that only appeal to internal features of the agent to account for knowledge are in trouble. How can they accommodate the plausible idea that reliable extended processes are conducive to knowledge?

Introductory readings:

- ▶ Clark, A. & Chalmers, D. (1998). The Extended Mind. *Analysis* 58: 7-19.
- ▶ Foglia, L & Wilson, R. A. Embodied Cognition. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Mandatory reading:

- ▶ Carter, J. A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. & Pritchard, D. (2014). Varieties of Externalism. *Philosophical Issues* 24: 63-109.

Advanced readings:

The following volume collects key philosophy of mind papers on the extended mind:

- ▶ Menary, R. (ed.). (2010). *The Extended Mind*. MIT Press.

Key papers in the intersection between epistemology and philosophy of mind are collected in the following issue of *Philosophical Issues*:

- ▶ *Extended Knowledge*. *Philosophical Issues*, 2014, Vol.24.

For fun:

- ▶ David Chalmers: Is Your Phone Part of Your Mind? (TED Talk) (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ksasPjrYFTg>)

2.3.2 Collective Belief

“The Church believes that abortion is murder”. How can we account for everyday ascriptions like that? How can we account for the fact that we commonly describe groups as rightfully adopting attitudes —e.g., beliefs? A controversial point in the literature is whether groups have those attitudes over and above the attitudes of their individual members. Summativists defend that a group believes a proposition if and only if all or most members of the group have that belief, while non-summativists defend views such as the plural subject account, which says that a group may rightfully believe a proposition if the members of the community are jointly committed to believe it as a body. Ultimately, the question is whether groups may be conceived as having their own agency and be in this way subject of epistemic evaluation.

Introductory readings:

- ▶ Blanchard, T. & Goldman. A. Social Epistemology. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
- ▶ Schmi, H. B. & Schweikard, D. P. Collective Intentionality. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

- ▶ Tollefsen, D. Collective Intentionality. *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Mandatory reading:

- ▶ Gilbert, M. (1987). Modelling Collective Belief. *Synthese* 73: 185-204.

Advanced readings:

A comprehensive list of references may be found in:

- ▶ Tollefsen, D. Collective Intentionality. *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

The PhilPapers category “Collective Mentality” provides a useful guide to the different sub-topics —e.g., collective belief, collective action, collective consciousness, collective intentionality— as well as to the relevant works in each of them (<http://philpapers.org/browse/collective-mentality>)

For fun:

- ▶ Alfred Birkegaard & Katja Gry Birkegaard Carlsen: Collaboration — A Documentary (<https://vimeo.com/119101747>)

2.3.3 Group Justification

At some point before the Iraq War, the Bush Administration formed the belief that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. Was that belief justified? Probably not, and time puts everyone in their place. But an interesting epistemological question arises: under what conditions are groups justified in their beliefs? Some philosophers think that group justification supervenes but cannot be equated with the justification of the group members’ beliefs. Other philosophers think that group justification is a matter of merely aggregating the justified beliefs of the group members. A growing literature tries to answer that question.

Introductory readings:

- ▶ Blanchard, T. & Goldman. A. Social Epistemology. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Mandatory reading:

- ▶ Goldman, A. (2014). Social Process Reliabilism: Solving Justification Problems in Collective Epistemology. In Lackey, J. (ed.) *Essays in Collective Epistemology*. Oxford University Press: 11–41.

Advanced readings:

The literature is just starting. The following volumes collect recent papers in social epistemology:

- ▶ Lackey, J. (ed.) (2014). *Essays in Collective Epistemology*. Oxford University Press.
- ▶ Goldman, A. & Whitcomb, D. (eds.) (2011). *Social Epistemology: Essential Readings*. Oxford University Press.

An exhaustive list of references may be found in:

- ▶ Blanchard, T. & Goldman. A. Social Epistemology. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

For fun:

- ▶ Jennifer Lackey: What is Justified Group Belief (Talk at Oxford University) (<https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/what-justified-group-belief>)

3 Organization

The course consists of a weekly session of two hours and will be run as a research seminar, which means that it will be discussion-focused and oriented towards writing a research paper.

3.1 Format of Seminar Sessions

Seminar sessions will be organized as follows:

- * 9:00-9:25: Presentation by a student
- * 9:25-10:00: Open discussion
- * 10:00-10:10: Break
- * 10:10-11:00: Open discussion

3.2 Scheduled Sessions and Deadlines

FRI. 25 SEPT 2015:	Introductory session
FRI. 2 OCT 2015:	No seminar
MODULE 1	Epistemological Sources
FRI. 9 OCT 2015:	Intuition: A Guide to Truth?
FRI. 16 OCT 2015:	The Epistemology of Memory
FRI. 23 OCT 2015:	Perception: Distinguishing the Senses
FRI. 6 NOV 2015:	The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: Epistemological Implications
MODULE 2	Knowledge and Consciousness
TUE. 10 NOV 2015:	Self-Consciousness: Immunity to Error Through Misidentification
FRI. 13 NOV 2015:	Anti-Individualism and Self-Knowledge
FRI. 20 NOV 2015:	The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism
FRI. 20 NOV 2015:	<i>Deadline</i> for submitting topic proposal (mandatory, unless you are taking the 2 nd exam opportunity)
FRI. 27 NOV 2015:	The Epistemic Role of Attention
MODULE 3	Extended and Collective Mentality
FRI. 4 DEC 2015:	Extended Mind and Extended Knowledge
FRI. 11 DEC 2015:	Collective Belief
FRI. 18 DEC 2015:	Group Justification
FRI. 18 DEC 2015:	<i>Deadline</i> for submitting first draft for feedback (optional)
FRI. 15 JAN 2016:	<i>Deadline</i> for submitting final draft (mandatory, unless you are taking the 2 nd exam opportunity)

Important: the session on 10 Nov 2015, Tuesday, will be from 11:00 to 13:00.

4 Evaluation

4.1 Grade

- * 80%: Research paper
- * 20%: Presentation and participation

KU Leuven Regulations: NA

If you don't attend the course as required or don't give a presentation, you will receive the result *not taken* (NA).

In case you cannot, for well-founded reasons, attend class as required, you will be given a make-up assignment—for example, a reading report on the material covered in the seminar session you missed. In case

you cannot, for serious reasons and regularly or for a long period of time, attend class as required or give a presentation on a scheduled date, you need to inform the examination ombudsperson ASAP.

KU Leuven Regulations: 2nd Exam Opportunity

The second examination attempt is limited to (re)submitting the research paper. Participation and/or presentation cannot be retaken. If you don't submit your research paper on the first examination date and you miss the 2nd exam opportunity, you will receive the NA result.

4.2 Participation

You are expected to participate and actively contribute to open discussions. For the most part, philosophy proceeds by making mistakes. During Q&A, professional philosophers miss the point and say unclear—or irrelevant—things all the time. So don't be afraid to give your opinion, whatever it is: no one will judge you. The only bad ideas are the ones not said.

4.3 Presentation

You are expected to give a presentation on the topic of one of the scheduled sessions. You have two complementary options. To prepare:

1. Slides.
2. A handout.

Your slides or your handout (or both) will be *uploaded to KU Leuven Toledo* for everyone's convenience. Send them to: fernando.broncanoberrocal@hiw.kuleuven.be

Deadline for sending your slides/handout: Wednesdays, 4 pm—so the rest of the students will have a full day to read the assigned text with the aid of the slides/handout.

Very important: Since each session will be on a different topic—meaning: a different literature—you are responsible for introducing the topic to your classmates. *Don't limit yourself to summarizing the contents of the mandatory reading.* You are expected to **present the topic** in an accessible way to the rest of the students, as if they had no background on the topic. That is, prepare your presentation—and the slides or handout—for a non-specialist audience.

Guidelines on the Format of Presentations

1. State the philosophical problem.
2. Briefly present the main solutions to the problem/the main theories about it—use the introductory readings for that.
3. Locate the author's position among those solutions/theories.
4. Present the author's main arguments.
5. Give your take on the philosophical problem—e.g., do you agree with the author's solution? are the other solutions more compelling?

Time for Presentation

No more than 25 min. Please rehearse.

Choosing a Topic for Presentation

You may choose the topic/session you want during the first week of the course —i.e., Sept. 25 - Oct. 2. Send an e-mail with your choice to fernando.broncanoberrocal@hiw.kuleuven.be. The rule for assigning presentations will be: first-come, first-served. If after the first week there are free slots left, the remaining sessions will be randomly assigned using a list randomizer. If there are more students than sessions, group presentations will be arranged.

4.4 Research Paper

You are expected to write a research paper on one topic of the seminar —see how to choose a topic below. In your research paper you may:

1. Give positive arguments for a philosophical thesis.
2. Critically assess one or several solutions to a philosophical problem tackled in the seminar.

Evaluation Criteria

Analytic philosophy aims to enhance rigor and clarity in thought and to avoid obscurantism. You are in an analytic philosophy seminar. So you are expected to give original arguments written with rigor and clarity. Papers will be graded accordingly, following these criteria:

1. *Originality*: whether the main points or arguments are novel.
2. *Argumentative rigor*: whether the paper shows philosophical rigor —e.g., does it have a sufficiently identifiable structure?, is it well-reasoned?
3. *Clarity of exposition*: whether the main points and arguments can be understood.

Length

Min. 3000 – max. 3500 words.

Due to its standards of clarity and rigor, writing good analytic philosophy is particularly hard. Don't waste precious time or space getting around the problem. Go straight to the point.

Choosing a Topic for Your Research Paper

You are free to choose the topic of your research paper as long as it is related to —i.e., not necessarily the same as— the topic of one the seminar sessions *or* modules. For example, if you want to work on memory —session 2—, you don't necessarily have to work on a problem in the epistemology of memory: you may work on theories of memory. You may also work on reasoning, because although no seminar session deals with it, it is an epistemological source —i.e., a topic of Module 1.

Check the *introductory readings* of the scheduled sessions as soon as possible —see the list of references of each topic— and pick the topic you find most exciting —writing about boring stuff is not only tedious: it also leads to bad arguments.

The topic of your research paper does not need to coincide with the topic of your presentation, although making them coincide will make things easier for you. You may also use this seminar to write on a topic related to your master thesis insofar as it is in the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of mind.

Send an e-mail with your topic proposal to fernando.broncanoberrocal@hiw.kuleuven.be as soon as you make up your mind. Sending a topic proposal by the deadline is *mandatory*. There are two practical reasons for this being mandatory. The first reason is that certain topics are non-starters for a term paper —e.g., too ambitious. So this first filter will help save your time and improve your grade. The second reason

is that psychological research indicates that externally imposed deadlines are more effective in avoiding procrastination than self-imposed costly ones (Ariely & Wertenbroch 2002, in *Psychological Science* 13: 219-224).

Feedback

You have the opportunity to get feedback on your first draft. There is a deadline for this too. It is optional, but *highly recommended* —it will help improve your grade.

Submission Method

Send your first/final draft by e-mail to fernando.broncanoberrocal@hiw.kuleuven.be. Pdf format is preferred. Expect confirmation of receipt.

4.5 Deadlines

Topic Proposal Submission

Fri. 20 Nov. 2015

It is mandatory, unless you are taking the 2nd exam opportunity.

First Draft for Feedback

Fri. 18 Dec. 2015

It is optional, but highly recommended.

Final Draft

Fri. 15 Jan. 2016

It is mandatory, unless you are taking the 2nd exam opportunity.

5 Resources

Check KU Leuven Toledo.

5.1 Getting Started with Philosophical Research

Philosophy has become a very specialized discipline in which one needs to get acquainted with new topics very quickly. Professional philosophers interested in investigating new topics use the following tools:

- ▶ *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (URL: <http://www.iep.utm.edu/>).
(An accessible encyclopedia of philosophy)
- ▶ *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/>).
(The most exhaustive encyclopedia of philosophy)
- ▶ *Philosophy Compass* (URL: [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/\(ISSN\)1747-9991](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1747-9991))
(Journal that publishes survey articles on particular problems for the non-specialist)
- ▶ *PhilPapers*
(The best on-line database of journal articles and philosophical works and an everyday tool of professional philosophers. To locate a philosophical problem, browse the PhilPapers categories)

5.2 Background Readings in Epistemology/Phil. of Mind

Epistemology

- ▶ Pritchard, D. (2006). *What is this Thing Called Knowledge?* Routledge.
(A clearly-written and accessible introduction to epistemology)
- ▶ Bernecker, S. & Pritchard, D. (eds) (2011). *The Routledge Companion to Epistemology*. Routledge.
(Very exhaustive and useful companion to epistemology; available at HIW Library)

Philosophy of Mind

- ▶ Braddon-Mitchell, D. & Jackson, F. (2007). *The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Second Edition*. Blackwell.
(A clearly-written and accessible introduction to philosophy of mind)
- ▶ Beckermann, A. & McLaughlin, B. P. (eds.) (2007). *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind*. Oxford University Press.
(Advanced handbook with papers by figures in the field)

5.3 Methodology: Reading, Writing and Presenting Philosophy

Before Reading the First Assigned Paper

- ▶ Guidelines on Reading Philosophy (by J. Pryor)

Before Writing Your Paper

- ▶ Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper (by J. Pryor)

Before Preparing Your Presentation

- ▶ Giving a Talk in Philosophy (by O. Koksvik)

During the Seminar

- ▶ Baggini, J. & Fosl, P. S. (2010). *The Philosopher's Toolkit: A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods*. Wiley-Blackwell.
(An accessible introduction to typically used philosophical concepts and techniques)