Papers
  1. forthcoming.   Epistemic Care and Epistemic Paternalism.   Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered.   Axtell, G. & Amiel, B. Rowman and Littlefield.
  2. ​​forthcoming.   Knowledge, Safety, and Gettierized Lottery Cases: Why Mere Statistical Evidence Is Not a (Safe) Source of Knowledge.  Philosophical Issues. A Suplement to Noûs  (preprint)
  3. forthcoming.   Difficulty    and Knowledge. Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches.   ​C. Kelp & J. Greco (eds.). Cambridge University Press (preprint)
  4. 2019. Epistemic Dependence and Cognitive Ability. ​Synthese (Special Issue: Epistemic Dependence)    (preprint  - published version)
  5. 2019.   A Taxonomy of Types of Epistemic Dependence: Introduction to the Synthese  Special Issue on Epistemic Dependence (with Jesús Vega)  ​   Synthese   (Special Issue: Epistemic Dependence)   (open access published version)
  6. 2019. Luck as Risk. Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck.  I. Church &   R. Hartman (eds.) . Routledge    (preprint - published version)​
  7. ​​2018. Knowledge and Tracking Revisited. ​ Analysis   (preprint  - published version)​
  8. 2018. Purifying Impure Virtue Epistemology. ​ Philosophical Studies   (preprint   -   published version)
  9. 2017. Hoops and Barns: A New Dilemma for Sosa (with C. Boult, P. Dimmock, H. Ghijsen, C. Kelp, & M. Simion).   ​Synthese (Special Issue: The Epistemology of Ernest Sosa)    (open access published version)
  10. 2017.   A Robust Enough Virtue Epistemology. Synthese (preprint - published version)
  11. 2017. Epistemic Luck. (with J. A. Carter). Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (preprint - published version)
  12. 2016: Well-Founded Belief and Perceptual Justification. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (preprint - published version  - reply)
  13. 2016: Luck. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy ​(preprint - published version)
  14. 2016: No Luck in the Distance: A Reply to Freitag. Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy (preprint - published version - reply)
  15. 2015: Luck as Risk and the Lack of Control Account of Luck. The Philosophy of Luck, D. H. Pritchard & L. Whittington (eds.). Wiley-Blackwell (preprint - published version - review)
  16. 2015: Luck as Risk and the Lack of Control Account of Luck. Metaphilosophy (preprint - published version)
  17. 2014: Anti-Luck (Too Weak) Virtue Epistemology. Erkenntnis (preprint - published version)
  18. 2014: Is Safety in Danger? Philosophia (preprint - published version - reply)
  19. 2013: Lies and Deception: A Failed Reconciliation. Logos & Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology (preprint - published version)

Edited Volumes
  1. forthcoming: The Epistemology of Group Disagreement (with J. Adam Carter).   Routledge. 
  2. 2019. Epistemic Dependence (with J. Vega). Special issue of Synthese


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