

Course: Philosophy of Mind & Epistemology (B-KUL-W0FC1A & B-KUL-W0EO9A)
KU Leuven — 1st Sem. 2014/2015
Instructor: Dr. Fernando Broncano-Berrocal
Time & Location: Tuesdays 11:00-13:00 — PI - room 01.22 (Vergaderzaal)
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Luck, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Agency

The course consists of a weekly session of two hours and will be run as a research seminar. Sessions will typically have the following format:

- (1) 10-15 min: Short introduction to the topic by the teacher.
- (2) 20 min: Oral presentation by a student.
- (3) 90-85 min: Open discussion of the text.

You are expected to prepare for the seminars by having closely read the assigned readings and also to attend and to participate in the sessions.

What should you have achieved by the end of the course?

- **Knowledge:** You should possess a profound knowledge of the current state of the art concerning the three main topics of the course.
- **Independence in Research:** You should be able to formulate an original/creative research question, develop a well-defined research approach and set up a well-organized research plan concerning one or several aspects of the topics.
- **Written Skills:** You should be able to write an original, clearly written and well-structured research paper following your research plan.
- **Oral skills:** You should be able to present and systematically defend orally the results of your research, stating with clarity your personal standpoint concerning the topics.

Previous Knowledge

- Knowledge of analytic philosophy and especially of epistemology will be useful, but by no means required. If students without enough background in analytic philosophy have difficulty in following the contents or the style of the course texts, individual or group tutoring sessions will be scheduled during office hours.

Evaluation

Grade:

- 70% Research paper.
- 30% Presentation and participation.

Presentation:

You are expected to give a presentation on the topic of one of the scheduled sessions. The presentation will be 20 min long, where approximately half of the presentation must be devoted to presenting the topic and the other half to giving original arguments for or against some of the thesis or accounts related to the topic.

There are two main motivations for making you give this kind of presentation: (1) this is a standard format of presentation in analytic philosophy, especially during PhD; (2) the presentation may serve as a starting point for the research paper.

You may choose the topic/session you want. The schedule of the presentations will be decided during the first sessions of the course.

Research paper:

You are expected to write a research paper (min. 3000 – max. 3500 words long) on one or several topics of the seminar. In your research paper you may:

- (1) Give positive arguments for a philosophical thesis.
- (2) Critically assess one or several theories seen during the course.

In both cases, you are expected to present original arguments written with rigor and clarity. Papers will be graded according to the following three criteria:

- (1) Originality (whether the main points or arguments are novel).
- (2) Argumentative rigor (whether the paper shows philosophical rigor, e.g., does it have a sufficiently identifiable structure?, is it well-reasoned?).
- (3) Clarity of exposition (whether the main points and arguments can be understood).

The main motivation for making you write a research paper according to these three criteria is that you develop an argumentative style when writing philosophy (keep in mind that analytic philosophy aims to enhance rigor and clarity in thought and to avoid obscurantism).

Although not mandatory, it is highly advisable that before starting to write the research paper you discuss with me the chosen topic and the planned structure of the paper.

Note on evaluation:

If you don't attend the course as required or don't give a presentation, you will receive the result 'not taken' (NA). In case you cannot, for well-founded reasons, attend class as required, you will be given a make-up assignment (for example, a reading report on the material covered in the seminar session which you missed). In the case you cannot, for serious reasons and regularly or for a long period of time, attend class as required or in case you cannot, for serious reasons, give a presentation on a scheduled date, you need to inform the examination ombudsperson.

Course Sessions & Readings

A reader will be available for purchase from NFK's *cursusdienst*. In addition, you will receive electronic copies of complementary course material.

Session 1. Introduction: The Analysis of Knowledge and the Gettier Problem

Part I. Luck (Sessions 2-4)

Session 2. The Modal Account of Luck

Mandatory reading:

- Pritchard, D. (forthcoming). The Modal Account of Luck. *Metaphilosophy* (to be reprinted in D. Pritchard & L. Whittington (eds.), *The Philosophy of Luck*, Wiley-Blackwell).

Session 3. The Lack of Control Account of Luck

Mandatory reading:

- Broncano-Berrocal, F. (forthcoming). Luck as Risk and the Lack of Control Account of Luck. *Metaphilosophy* (to be reprinted in D. Pritchard & L. Whittington (eds.), *The Philosophy of Luck*, Wiley-Blackwell).

Session 4. Skill and Luck

Mandatory reading:

- McKinnon, R. (2013). Getting Luck Properly Under Control. *Metaphilosophy*, 44: 496–511.

Complementary readings for Part I:

- Ballantyne, N. (2012). Luck and Interests. *Synthese*, 185: 319-34.
Coffman, E. J. (2007). Thinking about Luck. *Synthese*, 158: 385-98.

- Coffman, E. J. (2009). Does Luck Exclude Control? *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 87: 499-504.
- Lackey, J. (2008). What Luck is Not. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 86: 255-67.
- Latus, A. (2003). Constitutive Luck. *Metaphilosophy*, 34: 460-75.
- Levy, N. (2009). What, and Where, Luck Is: A Response to Jennifer Lackey. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 87: 489-97.
- Levy, N. (2011). *Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility* (Chapter 2 “An Account of Luck”). Oxford University Press.
- Riggs, W. (2009). Knowledge, Luck, and Control. In A. Haddock, A. Millar, & D. Pritchard (eds.): *Epistemic Value*. Oxford University Press.
- Steglich-Petersen, A. (2010). Luck as an Epistemic Notion. *Synthese*, 176: 361-77.

Part II. Epistemic Luck (Sessions 5-6)

Session 5. The Notion of Epistemic Luck

Mandatory readings:

- Unger, P. (1968). An Analysis of Factual Knowledge. *Journal of Philosophy*, 65: 157-70 (Excerpt).
- Pritchard, D. (2004). Epistemic Luck. *Journal of Philosophical Research* 29: 193-222.
- Pritchard, D. (2009). Apt Performance and Epistemic Value. *Philosophical Studies*, 143: 407-16 (Excerpt).

Session 6. Against the Anti-Luck Intuition

Mandatory reading:

- Baumann, P. (2012), No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00622.x.

Complementary readings for Part II:

- Becker, K. (2008). Epistemic Luck and the Generality Problem. *Philosophical Studies*, 139: 353-66.
- Carter, J. A. (2013). Extended Cognition and Epistemic Luck. *Synthese*, 190: 4201-14.
- Carter, J. A. & Pritchard, D. (forthcoming). Knowledge-How and Epistemic Luck. *Noûs*.
- Church, I. M. (2013). Getting 'Lucky' with Gettier. *European Journal of Philosophy*, 21: 37-49.
- Engel Jr. M (2011). Epistemic Luck. *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, URL: <http://www.iep.utm.edu/epi-luck/>
- Orozco, J. (2011). Epistemic Luck. *Philosophy Compass* 6: 11-21.
- Pritchard, D. (2005). *Epistemic Luck*. Oxford University Press.

Part III. Epistemic Agency (Sessions 7-13)

Session 7. The Notion of Intellectual Virtue

Mandatory reading:

- Sosa, E. (forthcoming). “Virtue Epistemology: Character versus Competence”, Chapter 2 of *Judgment and Agency*, Oxford University Press.

Complementary readings:

- Baehr, J. (2011). *The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology*. Oxford University Press.
- DePaul, M. & Zagzebski, L. (eds.) (2003). *Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology*. Oxford University Press.
- Lepock, C. (2011). Unifying the Intellectual Virtues. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 83, 106-28.
- Sosa, E. (2010). How Competence Matters in Epistemology. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 24, 465-75.
- Zagzebski, L. (1996). *Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge*. Cambridge University Press.

Session 8. The Situationist Challenge to Virtue Epistemology

Mandatory readings:

- Alfano, M. (2012), Expanding The Situationist Challenge to Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 62: 223–249.
- Turri, J. (forthcoming). Epistemic Situationism and Cognitive Ability. In M. Alfano & A. Fairweather (eds.), *Epistemic Situationism*. Oxford University Press.

Complementary readings:

Alfano, M. & Fairweather, A. (eds.) (forthcoming). *Epistemic Situationism*. Oxford University Press.
King, N. L. (2014). Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology: A Reply to the Situationist Challenge. *Philosophical Quarterly* 64: 243-25

Session 9. The Credit Theory of Knowledge

Mandatory reading:

- Lackey, J. (2009). Knowledge and Credit. *Philosophical Studies*, 142: 27-42.

Complementary readings:

Greco, J. (2004). A Different Sort of Contextualism. *Erkenntnis*, 61: 383-400.
Lackey, J. (2007). Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know. *Synthese*, 158: 345-61.
Riggs, W. (2007). Why Epistemologists Are So Down on Their Luck. *Synthese*, 158: 329-44.
Vaesen, K. (2011). Knowledge without Credit, Exhibit 4: Extended Cognition. *Synthese*, 181: 515-29.

Session 10. Pragmatic Virtue Epistemology

Mandatory reading:

- Greco, J. (2012). A (Different) Virtue Epistemology. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 85: 1-26.

Complementary readings:

Craig, E. (1990). *Knowledge and the State of Nature*. Oxford University Press.
Stanley, J. (2005). *Knowledge and Practical Interests*. Oxford University Press.

Session 11. Bi-Level Virtue Epistemology

Mandatory reading:

- Sosa, E. (forthcoming). "Judgment and Agency", Chapter 3 of *Judgment and Agency*, Oxford University Press.

Complementary readings:

Kornblith, H. (2010). What Reflective Endorsement Cannot Do. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 80: 1-19.
Lyons, J. (2013). Sosa on Reflective Knowledge and Knowing Full Well. *Philosophical Studies*, 166: 609-16.
Sosa, E. (2007). *A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I*. Oxford University Press.
Sosa, E. (2011). *Knowing Full Well*. Princeton University Press.
Turri, J. (2013). Bi-Level Virtue Epistemology. In J. Turri, (ed.): *Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa*. Philosophical Studies Series, 119: 147-64.

Session 12. Modal and Virtue Epistemologies Combined

Mandatory reading:

- Pritchard, P. (2012). Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology. *Journal of Philosophy*, 109 : 247-279.

Complementary readings:

Broncano-Berrocal, F. (2014). Anti-Luck (Too Weak) Virtue Epistemology. *Erkenntnis*, 79: 733-54.
Carter, J. A. (2013). A Problem for Pritchard's Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology. *Erkenntnis*, 78: 253-75.
Hudson, R. (2013). Saving Pritchard's Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology: The Case of Temp. *Synthese*, 191: 801-15.
Kelp, C. (2012). Knowledge: The Safe-Apt View. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2012.673726.

Session 13. The Achievement Account of Knowledge

Mandatory reading:

- Turri, J. (forthcoming). Knowledge as Achievement, More or Less. In M. A. Fernández (ed.), *Performance Epistemology*, Oxford University Press.

Complementary readings:

- Greco, J. (2010). *Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity*. Cambridge University Press.
- Jarvis, B. (2013). Knowledge, Achievement, and Luck. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 94: 1-23.
- Pritchard, D. (2008). Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 58: 437-47.
- Pritchard, D. (2009). Apt Performance and Epistemic Value. *Philosophical Studies*, 143: 407-16.
- Pritchard, D. (2010). Achievements, Luck and Value. *Think*, 25: 1-12.

Background Readings in Epistemology

Bernecker, S. & Pritchard, D. (eds). *The Routledge Companion of Epistemology*. Routledge.

(Very exhaustive and useful companion to epistemology; available at HIW Library)

Fieser, J. and Dowden, B. (eds.) *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (URL: <http://www.iep.utm.edu/>).

(An accessible encyclopedia of philosophy)

Pritchard, D. (2006). *What is this Thing Called Knowledge?* Routledge.

(If you are looking for an introduction to epistemology, check this one; all the basics you need are there)

Philosophy Compass (URL: [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/\(ISSN\)1747-9991](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1747-9991))

(Journal that publishes survey articles for the non-specialist)

Zalta, E. (ed.) *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/>).

(The most exhaustive encyclopedia of philosophy)

Readings that Will Save You Time

Before reading the first assigned paper:

- Pryor, J. Guidelines on Reading Philosophy

Before preparing your presentation:

- Koksvik, O. Giving a Talk in Philosophy

Before starting to write your paper:

- Pryor, J. Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper

After writing your paper:

- Proofreading Checklist

During the whole course (and especially when writing your paper):

- Baggini, J. & Fosl, P. S. (2010). *The Philosopher's Toolkit: A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods*. Wiley-Blackwell.